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Abstract 
 
ABE has become an effective tool for data protection in cloud computing. However, since 
users possessing the same attributes share the same private keys, there exist some malicious 
users exposing their private keys deliberately for illegal data sharing without being detected, 
which will threaten the security of the cloud system. Such issues remain in many current 
ABE schemes since the private keys are rarely associated with any user specific identifiers. 
In order to achieve user accountability as well as provide key exposure protection, in this 
paper, we propose a key-insulated ciphertext policy attribute based encryption with key 
exposure accountability (KI-CPABE-KEA). In our scheme, data receiver can decrypt the 
ciphertext if the attributes he owns match with the self-centric policy which is set by the data 
owner. Besides, a unique identifier is embedded into each user’s private key. If a malicious 
user exposes his private key for illegal data sharing, his identity can be exactly pinpointed by 
system manager. The key-insulation mechanism guarantees forward and backward security 
when key exposure happens as well as provides efficient key updating for users in the cloud 
system. The higher efficiency with proved security make our KI-CPABE-KEA more 
appropriate for secure data sharing in cloud computing. 
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1. Introduction 
With the technical development of distributed storage and virtualization, more and more 
users tend to move their data to the cloud [1]. The cloud center contains massive private data 
of users, hence special encryption techniques should be implemented to protect the privacy 
and confidentiality of these sensitive data from being attacked. However, traditional 
cryptosystem can hardly meet a serious of new demands which emerge in cloud computing 
systems. Under this situation, attribute based encryption (ABE) [2] is proposed and has been 
divided into two mechanisms: KP-ABE [6-7] [23-24] and CP-ABE [3] [22]. Among the two 
kinds of ABE mechanisms, CP-ABE is considered more appropriate in terms of data 
protection in cloud computing, since it is equipped with the ability of providing flexible 
self-centric data access management. In CP-ABE, the private keys of a user corresponds with 
the attributes he owns, while the ciphertext corresponds a self-centric access policy which is 
made by the data owner. A data receiver is capable of decrypting the encrypted file provided 
that the attributes he possesses match with the policy.  
However, key abuse [19] is a challenging issue in attribute based cryptosystem. ABE is an 
advanced type of broadcast encryption, users possessing the same attributes share the same 
private keys. There may exist some traitors expose their private keys illegally without being 
detected, which will threaten the security of the whole system. Key abuse issues remain in 
many current ABE schemes as the private keys generated are rarely associated with any 
users’ specific identifiers. One method is to assign each user a unique pair of attribute public 
key and private key, when private key exposure happens, the identity of traitor can easily be 
traced. However, if this mechanism is introduced, the encryption cost will be enormous and 
the advantages of ABE will no longer exist. Thus, it is essential to propose a scheme which 
takes the advantage of ABE as well as meets the demands of distinguishing different users 
by the private keys they possess. 
Existing researches concerning ABE have achieved much progress with regard to 
fine-grained access control [4-5] [15], flexible attribute revocation [9] [14], data 
authentication [8] [16], etc. However, key exposure accountability and key exposure 
protection in ABE have not received much concern. Some schemes have successfully 
achieved user accountability in ABE [10-13], but the computation cost and the size of private 
keys in their schemes are too large, which make them impractical to be totally applied to 
some sceneries with constrained computing resources such as wireless networks, mobile 
cloud computing, etc. Besides, although schemes in [10-13]are capable of tracing the 
malicious user when key exposure happens, the system will still be at risk since there doesn’t 
exist effective key updating mechanisms to guarantee forward and backward security. If the 
private key owned by valid user is leaked, any other user obtaining it can decrypt the 
corresponding ciphertext since the leaked private key is still a valid one. Consequently, all 
the potential threat calls for frequent key refreshing in attribute based cryptosystem. When 
key exposure happens, effective and efficient key updating mechanism should be 
implemented to keep the system from potential threat. Consequently, a scheme equipped 
with both user accountability and secure key updating is urgently to be put forward.  
To better tackle the issues discussed above, in this paper, we propose a key-insulated 
ciphertext based attribute based encryption with key exposure accountability 
(KI-CPABE-KEA) scheme. In our scheme, a unique identifier is embedded into each user’s 
private key. If a malicious user leaks his private key for illegal data sharing, the system 
manger can pinpoint the exact identity of the traitor. We introduce key-insulation mechanism 
into our scheme and divide the system lifetime into several discrete time periods. When time 
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period evolves, only part of the private keys have to be updated and the system public 
parameters remain unchanged. Due to the key-insulation mechanism, our scheme is very 
efficient with regard to key updating computation cost as well as provides key exposure 
protection when key leakage happens. Moreover, our KI-CPABE-KEA is proved to be 
secure under DBDH assumption. The higher performance makes our scheme more 
appropriate for secure data protection in cloud computing. 
The rest of paper is arranged as follows: 
Section 2 reviews relevant research related to ABE with user accountability and gives the 
background of some fundamental preliminaries which are used to construct our scheme. 
Section 3 illustrates the model of our KI-CPABE-KEA and makes some essential security 
definitions. Section 4 contains a full description of the algorithms in KI-CPABE-KEA along 
with the correctness proof. Section 5 presents the security analysis and evaluates our scheme 
with respect to computation efficiency. In section 6, the conclusion of this paper and future 
prospects are made. 
2. Related works and preliminaries 
2.1 Related works 
The notion of ABE was first put forward in [1]. In ABE, user’s access privileges are 
described by a numebr of attributes rather than an identity string. A user can get access to the 
ciphertext only if his attributes match with the access structure which is made by the data 
owner.Equipped with the advantages of providing flexible data control, ABE is widely 
implemented as an effective tool for secure data sharing between users in different 
application scenarios [14] [18] [20]. 
Key exposure is a challenging problem in ABE. M. J. Hinek et al. in [10] first proposed a 
token-based ABE which provides key exposure accountability. In their scheme, user’s keys 
consists of two parts: private keys and delegation keys. User’s delegation key is embedded 
with user’s unique identifier, but the contribution of delegation agent will add more 
computation cost to the whole system. Jin et al. in [11] tackled the key exposure problem by 
proposing an accountable and anonymous CP-ABE scheme. In their scheme, the identity of 
the traitor can be traced in a black-box model. Their scheme is provably secure under DBDH 
assumption. Based on [11], Fatos et al. in [12] achieved user accountability in CP-ABE and 
apply their scheme to PHR systems. In their scheme,a unique identifier is inserted into user’s 
decryption key, if a malicious PHR user leaks his private key deliberately to other 
unauthorized users, the identity of the malicious user can be exactly traced. Wang et al. in 
[13] proposed a key-policy ABE with user accountability. The identity of traitor can be 
traced by a white-box setting, but the overhead of encryption and decryption is too large. 
Besides, although the above schemes have achieved user accountability, they haven’t 
taken backward and forward security into full consideration when key exposure happens, 
which may bring serious security risks to the system. If the private key owned by a malicious 
user is leaked, any user obtaining the private key can decrypt the corresponding ciphertext 
since the leaked private key is a valid one. Thus, when key exposure happens, the identity of 
the malicious user should be exactly pinpointed by the system manager; more importantly, 
effective and efficient key updating mechanism should be implemented to keep the system 
secure.The mechanism of key-insulation was initially proposed in [21]. Key-insulation is a 
promising tool to guarantee forward and backward security as well as achieves high 
efficiency of key updating. In this mechanism, the lifespan of a cryptosystem is partitioned 
by several discrete time periods. The public parameters remain unaltered during the whole 
time periods, while private keys are updated when system enters into a new time period. 
KSII TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS VOL. 10, NO. 5, May 2016                     2397 
Key-insulation mechanism can provide full security when user’s private key exposure 
happens, which can also be introduced to provide key exposure protection in attribute based 
cryptosystem[25]. 
2.2 Hardness assumptions 
a. Discrete Logarithm Assumption (DL): 
Given 𝑋𝑋,𝑃𝑃 ∈ 𝐺𝐺,it is computational infeasible to calculate the value of 𝑎𝑎 (𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞∗) such 
that 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 with a non-negligible probability within probabilistic polynomial-time. 
b. Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDH). 
For 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐, 𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞∗, given (𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 ,𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑏 ,𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 , 𝑧𝑧), it is computational infeasible to distinguish the 
following tuples ( 𝐴𝐴 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 ,𝐵𝐵 = 𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑏 ,𝐶𝐶 = 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 , ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 ) and ( 𝐴𝐴 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 ,𝐵𝐵 = 𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑏 ,𝐶𝐶 =
𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 , ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑧𝑧) with non-negligible probability within probabilistic polynomial-time. 
3. Models and assumptions 
3.1 The model of our KI-CPABE-KEA 
As is shown in Fig. 1, the model includes 6 entitles: CSP (cloud service provider), AA 
(attribute authority), key helper, tracer, data owner and data receiver.  
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Fig. 1. The model of our KI-CPABE-KEA 
 
CSP assigns a global unique identifier to each user in the system and responses to the data 
requests made by users. AA manages the global attributes in the system. Meanwhile, AA 
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generates initial private key for a user according to the attribute set and the unique identifier 
he owns. Key helper generates the key updating component for each user when system 
evolves into a new time period. Data owner encrypts his file using a policy and transfers the 
encrypted data to CSP. Data receiver sends access request to CSP and decrypts the ciphertext 
under the condition that the attributes he owns match with the encryption policy .When a 
malicious user in the system leaks his private key deliberately for the purpose of illegal data 
sharing, tracer can pinpoint the exact identity of the malicious user according to the exposed 
private key. 
3.2 Formulized definitions of algorithms 
Our KI-CPABE-KEA includes five algorithms. 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(1𝜑𝜑){𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃,𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃}：This algorithm takes a parameter 𝜑𝜑 as input, it returns the 
system public parameter 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, master key 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 and helper key 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃.     𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼{𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃, {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖} , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃0}{ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0} : On input the 
system public key 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, the master key 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃, initial time period 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃0 and a user’s 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 with 
attribute set {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖}, AA outputs  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0 as the initial private key of a user. 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒{𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛+1,𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃, {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖},  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛}{𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛+1 ,  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛}:The algorithm takes 
two time periods 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛  ,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛+1 ,attribute set  {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖}  and  𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃  as input, it outputs the key 
updating component 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛+1.Users update their temporal private keys to the lasted version 
by calculating 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛+1 =  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛+1. 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 {𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀, 𝛾𝛾}{𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇}：This algorithm takes the systems public parameter 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, a 
plaintext  𝑀𝑀 ,  and an encryption policy 𝛾𝛾  as input. Then the algorithm outputs a 
ciphertext 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇. 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆{ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 ,𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇}{𝑀𝑀}: The algorithm takes 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇  and receiver’s temporal private 
key 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 as input, it outputs the plaintext  𝑀𝑀. 
3.3 Security model 
Definition: Our KI-CPABE-KEA has the essential confidentiality in selective model there 
exists an 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 has unneglectable advantage in winning the following game: 
Phase 1 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 claims an access structure 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 and {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐} is the attribute set involved. 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 runs 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 procedure to obtain the system parameters 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and master key 
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃. It sends 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 to 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘. 
Phase 2 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴: 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 can ask for the result of the following queries to 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼 query: 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 can obtain initial private key for 
attribute set 𝑆𝑆 by running 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼 algorithm and sends the results 
back to 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘. Note that |𝑆𝑆 ∩ {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐}| < 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 , 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥  is the threshold value of each 
node 𝑥𝑥 in the 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐. 
𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘  𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼 query: 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝  can obtain temporal private 
key for attribute set 𝑆𝑆 by running  𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 algorithms and sends the results back to 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘. Note that |𝑆𝑆 ∩ {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐}| < 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥, 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 is the threshold value of each node 𝑥𝑥 in 
the 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐. 
The queries described in phase 2 can be asked by 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 for a bounded times. 
Phase 3 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒: 
KSII TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS VOL. 10, NO. 5, May 2016                     2399 
At the current time period 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 , 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 picks 𝑀𝑀0  and𝑀𝑀1 ,which haven’t queried 
before. 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 chooses  𝜎𝜎 ∈ {0,1}  randomly and calculates 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇∗ = 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆{𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎 ,𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐} .Then 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 sends the result back to 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘.  
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 outputs a value 𝜎𝜎∗ as a conjecture of 𝜎𝜎. If 𝜎𝜎∗ = 𝜎𝜎 then 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 wins 
the game.𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  cannot ask 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝  for 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼 
query for the challenging attribute set {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐}. 
Denote 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴) = �𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝[𝜎𝜎∗ = 𝜎𝜎] − 1
2
� to be the advantage in the challenge game.  
4. Constructions 
The concrete constructions of our KI-CPABE-KEA are described as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: Let 𝐺𝐺1  and 𝐺𝐺2  be two cyclic groups with prime order  𝑆𝑆 . Denote g  is the 
generator of 𝐺𝐺1.Let ?̂?𝑒 ∶ 𝐺𝐺1 × 𝐺𝐺1 → 𝐺𝐺2 be a bilinear pairing. Define a Lagrange interpolation 
function ∆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥)= ∏ 𝑥𝑥−𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∈𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 .Define a hash function: 𝐻𝐻1: {0,1}∗ → 𝐺𝐺1 . AA randomly 
chooses 𝑘𝑘,𝑆𝑆 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗ . For each attribute 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, AA randomly chooses 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗ .Key helper picks 
ℎ ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝
∗  as its master key and calculates 𝑔𝑔ℎ . The system master keys 
are {𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽, 𝑆𝑆,𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,ℎ}, system public parameters are {𝐺𝐺1,𝐺𝐺2,𝑆𝑆,𝑔𝑔, ?̂?𝑒,𝑔𝑔ℎ , ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑦𝑦,𝑔𝑔𝑢𝑢,𝐻𝐻1,𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽}. 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼: At initial time period 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃0, AA generates the initial 
private key 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0  for a user possessing attribute set {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖} as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0 =  {𝑃𝑃 = 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦+𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐻𝐻1(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢,∀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃0)ℎ,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′ = 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖} 
Note that 𝑃𝑃,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′ remain unchanged throughout the whole system lifetime, while 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 
updates when system enters a new time period. 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒: In order to update user’s private key from time period 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛−1 to 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,key 
helper calculates the updated key component 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛  for each attribute 𝐼𝐼 as 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 =
�
𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛)
𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛−1)�ℎ and delivers it to users. Users update their temporal private keys to the latest 
version by calculating 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛−1 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛. The format of temporal private key at 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 can be denoted by:  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 =  {𝑃𝑃 = 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦+𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐻𝐻1(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢,∀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)ℎ,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′ = 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖}. 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: Data owner randomly chooses a polynomial 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥 for each node 𝑥𝑥 in the access 
control structure 𝛾𝛾. Denote 𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 to be the degree of 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥 and 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 to be the threshold value 
node .Let 𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 = 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 − 1. For the root node data owner sets  𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡(0) = 𝐴𝐴. For any other 
node (except for root node) in 𝛾𝛾, let 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0) = 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(𝑥𝑥)𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥). Let {𝐼𝐼} to be the leaf 
nodes in 𝛾𝛾, then the ciphertext is constructed as: 
𝐶𝐶0 = 𝑀𝑀?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 
𝐶𝐶1 = 𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 
𝐶𝐶2 = 𝑔𝑔𝑢𝑢∙𝑦𝑦 
∀ 𝐼𝐼 ∈ 𝛾𝛾,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(0),𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(0),𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(0)                             (1) 
Data owner uploads the ciphertext 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 = {𝐶𝐶0,𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖 } to cloud service provider. 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆:  Upon receiving 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇{𝐶𝐶0,𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖 }  from cloud service provider, data 
receiver decrypts the ciphertext by calculating: 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝐶𝐶0∙?̂?𝑝(𝐻𝐻1(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖),𝐶𝐶2)
?̂?𝑝(𝐾𝐾,𝐶𝐶1) ∏ ?̂?𝑝(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 ,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖)?̂?𝑝(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′,𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖)∙?̂?𝑝(𝑔𝑔ℎ,𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖∈𝛾𝛾                                              (2) 
Correctness proof: 
2400             Hong et al.: A key-insulated CP-ABE with key exposure accountability for secure data sharing in the cloud 
For each leaf node in the 𝛾𝛾,we have: 
?̂?𝑒(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 ,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖)
?̂?𝑒(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′,𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖) ∙ ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔ℎ,𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖) = ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)ℎ,𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(0))?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(0)) ∙ ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔ℎ ,𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(0)) = ?̂?𝑒�𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟,𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(0)� = ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(0)                                                (3) 
For each non-leaf node, let 𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥(𝑧𝑧), 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥 , = {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥(𝑧𝑧): 𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥}. 
𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥 = �𝐹𝐹𝑧𝑧∆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥,(0)
𝑧𝑧∈𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥
= ��?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑧𝑧(0)�∆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥,(0)
𝑧𝑧∈𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥
 
= ��?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧)�𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥(𝑧𝑧)��∆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥,(0)
𝑧𝑧∈𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥
 
= ��?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(𝑖𝑖)�∆𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥,(0)                          
𝑧𝑧∈𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥
 = ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0)                                                                                        (4) 
Thus, the algorithm recovers the value of 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 =  ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦 using Lagrange interpolation 
function. Then the plaintext can be recovered by: 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝐶𝐶0 ∙ ?̂?𝑒(𝐻𝐻1(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖),𝐶𝐶2)?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦
?̂?𝑒(𝑃𝑃,𝐶𝐶1)  = 𝐶𝐶0 ∙ ?̂?𝑒(𝐻𝐻1(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖),𝑔𝑔𝑢𝑢∙𝑦𝑦)?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦
?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦+𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 𝐻𝐻1(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢,𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦)                                                               = 𝑀𝑀 ∙ ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦                                                                                           = 𝑀𝑀                                                                                                        (5) 
5. Security proof and performance analysis 
5.1 Security proof: 
Theorem: If our scheme can be broken by 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 in the selective model, then a 
simulator can be constructed to break the DBDH hardness assumption with an unneglectable 
advantage. 
Proof: In the challenge game, if there exists an 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  which has advantage 𝜀𝜀 in 
attacking our KI-CPABE-KEA, there exists a simulator which is capable of breaking the 
DBDH hardness assumption with an advantage of 𝜀𝜀 2� . 
The simulator is constructed as follows: 
Phase 1  𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: 
Defines a global attribute set 𝑈𝑈 = {1,2, … 𝐼𝐼}.Defines 𝐺𝐺1 and 𝐺𝐺2 be two cyclic groups of 
prime order 𝑆𝑆. The generator of 𝐺𝐺1 is denoted by 𝑔𝑔. Defines a bilinear pairing ?̂?𝑒:𝐺𝐺1 ×
𝐺𝐺1 → 𝐺𝐺2. Defines a hash function 𝐻𝐻1: {0,1}∗ → 𝐺𝐺. Randomly picks 𝜇𝜇 ∈ {0,1}, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐, 𝑧𝑧 ∈
𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝 . 
Let �
(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶,𝑍𝑍) = �𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 ,𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑏 ,𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 , ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐�      𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇 = 0(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶,𝑍𝑍) = �𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 ,𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑏 ,𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 , ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑧𝑧�          𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇 = 1 
Simulator sets the public parameters as follows:  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = { 𝐺𝐺1,𝐺𝐺2, ?̂?𝑒,𝐻𝐻1,𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑏 ,𝑈𝑈}. 
The aim of simulator is to output a value 𝜇𝜇∗ as a guess of 𝜇𝜇. 
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𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 defines an attribute set {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐} with an encryption policy 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 and plays the 
challenge game in it. Simulator acts as 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 and runs 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 as a subprogram. 
Phase 2: 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴     𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 can make the following queries to simulator:     𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼 query: 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 submits queries for initial private 
key generation for an attribute set 𝑆𝑆(provided |𝑆𝑆 ∩ {𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐}| < 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥, 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 is the threshold 
value of each node in the 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐). 
Simulator picks 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,ℎ,𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝∗  and sets 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0 as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0:�𝑃𝑃 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏+𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 𝐻𝐻1(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢,∀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃0)ℎ,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′ = 𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏+𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽 𝐻𝐻1(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢,∀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0 = 𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃0)ℎ,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′ = 𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∉ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    
Simulator sends 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0 to 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 . 
𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘  𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼 query: 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 submits queries for temporal 
private key generation for an attribute set 𝑆𝑆. Simulator responds 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛  as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇0:�𝑃𝑃 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏+𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐻𝐻1(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢,∀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)ℎ,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′ = 𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏+𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐻𝐻1(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢,∀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 = 𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)ℎ,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′ = 𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∉ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐          
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 can make a bounded queries as described above. It can be seen that the 
simulator is consistent with our scheme.      𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒: 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 picks plaintexts 𝑀𝑀0  and 𝑀𝑀1. Simulator chooses 𝜎𝜎 ∈ {0,1}  and 
calculates 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎 = 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆{𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎 ,𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐}. The encryption process is as follows: 
Randomly chooses a polynomial 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥  for each node 𝑥𝑥  in the user’s access control 
structure 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐. Denote 𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 to be the degree of 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥 and 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 to be the threshold value of each 
node. Let 𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 = 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 − 1. Simulator sets  𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡(0) = 𝐴𝐴 for the root node. For any other node 
(except for root node) in the access tree, let 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥(0) = 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(𝑥𝑥)𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥). Denote {𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐} to be 
the leaf node of 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐, the ciphertext 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎 is constructed as: 
𝐶𝐶0 = 𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎 ∙ 𝑍𝑍,𝐶𝐶1 = 𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦,𝐶𝐶2 = 𝑔𝑔𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦 
∀ 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(0),𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(0),𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(0) 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎 = �𝐶𝐶0,𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐�                                                          (7) 
Let 𝐴𝐴 = 𝑐𝑐, according to setting in 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 phase, 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎  equals to : 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎 = �𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 ,𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 = 0𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑧𝑧,𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2,𝐶𝐶1,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝐶𝐶3,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 = 1       
When 𝜎𝜎 = 0 ,𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎 is a legal ciphertext in our model.𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  outputs a value 𝜎𝜎∗as a 
guess of 𝜎𝜎. 
If 𝜎𝜎∗ = 𝜎𝜎, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  wins the game and the advantage can be denoted by: 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴) = �𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝[𝜎𝜎∗ = 𝜎𝜎] − 12� 
Then we will discuss simulator’s advantage in distinguishing the following two tuples 
{𝐴𝐴 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 ,𝐵𝐵 = 𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑏 ,𝐶𝐶 = 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 , ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐} and {𝐴𝐴 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 ,𝐵𝐵 = 𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑏 ,𝐶𝐶 = 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 , ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑧𝑧}. 
When 𝜎𝜎 = 1 , 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎  is a invalid ciphertext and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  cannot acquire useful 
information of  𝜎𝜎.Under this condition the advantage can be denoted by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝(𝜎𝜎∗ ≠ 𝜎𝜎|𝜎𝜎 = 1) = 1
2
                                                             (8) 
Since when 𝜎𝜎∗ ≠ 𝜎𝜎, the simulator outputs 𝜇𝜇 = 1, so: 
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𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝(𝑆𝑆∗ = 𝑆𝑆|𝜎𝜎 = 1) = 1
2
                                                             (9) 
When 𝜎𝜎 = 0,𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎 is a legal ciphertext. According to the assumption, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 has an 
advantage 𝜀𝜀. Under this condition the advantage can be denoted by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝(𝜎𝜎∗ = 𝜎𝜎|𝜎𝜎 = 0) = 1
2
+ 𝜀𝜀                                                     (10) 
Because when 𝜎𝜎∗ = 𝜎𝜎 the simulator outputs 𝜇𝜇 = 0, so:  
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝(𝑆𝑆∗ = 𝑆𝑆|𝜎𝜎 = 0) = 1
2
+ 𝜀𝜀                                                     (11) 
As is mentioned above, the advantage of simulator in breaking the DBDH assumption is: 12𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝(𝑆𝑆∗ = 𝑆𝑆|𝜎𝜎 = 0) + 12𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝(𝑆𝑆∗ = 𝑆𝑆|𝜎𝜎 = 1) − 12 = 12 �12 + 𝜀𝜀� + 12 × 12 − 12 = 𝜀𝜀
2
                                                                                             (12) 
5.2 Collusion resistance 
In our KI-CPABE-KEA, a specific random number chosen by AA is embedded into each 
user’s private key, consequently, it is computational infeasible combine them to decrypt a 
valid ciphertext. As is discussed in section 4, to decrypt a ciphertext, it is essential for the 
colluding attacker to recover the value of ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦. To achieve this goal, the attacker must 
pair the ciphertext and the other colluding users’ private keys for an attribute (assume that 
the attribute is not owned by attacker). However, this results in the value ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 =
?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)(𝑦𝑦−𝑟𝑟)𝑦𝑦 ∙ ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑟𝑟 hidden by a random value 𝑝𝑝, which is uniquely distributed to users 
in the cloud system. This value is able to be calculated only when the corresponding private 
key components a user possesses satisfy with the encryption policy embedded in the 
ciphertext. Consequently, the target value ?̂?𝑒(𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦  cannot be calculated by collusion 
attack due to the hidden value is uniquely distributed in the private keys of each user. 
5.3 Forward and backward security with efficient key updating 
Our KI-CPABE-KEA not only achieves efficient key updating at a very low cost, but also 
guarantees the forward security and backward security when attribute revocation or key 
exposure happens. Assume that user’s attribute 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 has to be revoked after the time period 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,then he will no longer receives the key updating information 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛+1 from the key 
helper, consequently, he cannot update his temporal private key 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛  to the latest 
version. When key exposure happens at period 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛, the system can still maintain its security 
by updating users’ temporal private keys to 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛+1 version. Without loss of generality, when 
a user’s private key leaks during period 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛, the system still maintains safely after 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 
since all the temporal private keys have been securely updated. This meets the requirements 
of both forward security and backward security. Besides, our scheme also supports random 
access key updating since key helper is capable of updating users’ temporal private keys 
from any previous time periods(denote these time periods by 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎) to the lasted version in 
just one step by calculating 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎)ℎ ∙ �𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛)𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝)�ℎ. 
Then we will discuss the computation cost of key updating in our key-insulated scheme. 
When period 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛+1 arrives, key helper calculates 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛+1 = �𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛+1)𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛) �ℎ and sends it 
to user. User updates his private key by calculating 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛+1 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛+1.During the 
whole key updating process, for each attribute key helper has to run 2 hash operation and 1 
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exponential operation, user only runs 1 multiply operation. Compared with many ABE 
schemes with key refreshing mechanism, our scheme has lower computation in the key 
updating process. Besides, the system parameters remain unchanged during the system 
lifetime, and the key updating process only needs the participation of key helper and user, 
which relieves AA from the heavy computation load of key-regeneration.  
5.4 Traitor tracing 
When a malicious user (denote 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 as his unique identity and 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛  as the private 
key he owns) leaks his private key deliberately in the cloud system for illegal data sharing, 
then his identity can be exactly pinpointed by tracer. Two main methods can be adopted for 
traitor tracing as follows: 
a.Upon receiving a legal private key 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 =  {𝑃𝑃 = 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦+𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐻𝐻1(𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢,∀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∈
𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)ℎ ,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′ = 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖}from CSP, tracer firstly recovers the attribute 
set belonging to the malicious user from 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′ and calculates 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟 as follows: 
𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)−ℎ                                              (13) 
Then, the identity can be pinpointed by: 
𝐻𝐻1(𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) = �𝑃𝑃 ∙ �𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽�−1�𝑢𝑢−1 = �𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦+𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐻𝐻1(𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢 ∙ �𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽�−1�𝑢𝑢−1         (14) 
Correctness proof: 
𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)−ℎ = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)ℎ ∙ 𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻1(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛)−ℎ                  = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟                                                
𝐻𝐻1(𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) = �𝑃𝑃 ∙ �𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽�−1�𝑢𝑢−1 
= �𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦+𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐻𝐻1(𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢 ∙ �𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽�−1�𝑢𝑢−1                           = 𝐻𝐻1(𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢−1                                                                 = 𝐻𝐻1(𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)                                                                      (15) 
 
b.Since user’s private key is unique, if the amount of users is not huge, tracer can build a 
list recoding each private key with its corresponding user’s identity as Table 1 shows. When 
private key exposure happens, tracer searches the identifier which corresponds to the leaked 
private key in the list and the traitor is able to be exactly traced. 
 
Table 1. List of each private key with its corresponding user’s identity 
 
User’s identity Corresponding private key 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 
… … 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 
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5.5 Efficiency comparison 
In attribute based cryptosystem, the pairing operation and the exponential operation will 
consume more computation cost than other operations [17]. Thus, reducing the number of 
pairing operation and exponential operation will increase the efficiency of the algorithm to a 
large extent. In our scheme, according to the 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 algorithm, the data owner needs to run 
3n+3 times of exponential operation (assuming the amount of attributes concerned in 
encryption is n). While in decryption, each data receiver takes 3n+2 times of pairing 
operation.      With regard to the sizes of private keys and ciphertext, according to 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼 and 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 algorithms, the size of private key for a 
single user is 2n+1|p|, and the size of ciphertext is 3n+2|p|. We denote “Exp” as exponential 
operation and “Pair” as pairing operation, the performance comparison results with schemes 
in [12] and [26] are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Efficiency comparison 
Scheme Encryption 
Cost 
Decryption Cost Size of 
private key 
Size of 
ciphertext 
Key exposure 
protection 
[12] (4n+4) Exp (4n+1) Pair+ 
3 Exp 
4n|p| (4n+2)|p| No 
[26] (5n+3) Exp (3n+1)Pair+ 
(n+2) Exp 
(2n+4)|p| (3n+3)|p| No 
Ours (3n+3) Exp (3n+2) Pair+ 
n Exp 
(2n+1)|p| (3n+2)|p| Yes 
 
From Table 2, it can be figured out that the overall computation cost of encryption and 
decryption is lower in our scheme. Besides, our scheme outperforms with respect to the sizes 
of private key and ciphertext. As is discussed above, the overall efficiency of our scheme is 
higher compared to previous schemes in [12][26]. 
6. Conclusion 
We center on the demand of key exposure protection in attribute based cryptosystem and 
construct a key-insulated ciphertext policy attribute based encryption with key exposure 
accountability (KI-CPABE-KEA) for secure data protection in cloud computing. When a 
malicious user leaks his private key deliberately for illegal data sharing, the tracer can 
pinpoint his identity exactly. Besides, the key-insulation mechanism guarantees forward and 
backward security when key exposure happens. The higher efficiency with proved security 
make our KI-CPABE-KEA more appropriate for secure data sharing in cloud computing.    
Our future research direction should focus on the key-insulated attribute based signature, 
which serves as an effective tool for data authentication in attribute based cryptosystem. 
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